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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (j) . This case was transferred pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) by the Utah Supreme Court, which has 
original appellate jurisdiction under either section 78-2-
2(e) (ii) or -2(j) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether the District Court erred in denying the Cross-
Appellant, Rio, Inc. dba Rio Grande Cafe ("Cafe") an award 
of litigation expenses under the Small Business Equal Access 
to Justice Act (the "Act") contained in Title 78, Chapter 
27a of the Utah Code. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27a-l, et seq. (2002). 
See Addendum A. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27a-4 (2002). Litigation 
expense award authorized in actions by state. 
In any civil judicial action commenced by 
the state, which action involves the 
business regulatory functions of the 
state, a court may award reasonable 
litigation expenses to any small business 
which is a named party in the action if 
the small business prevails and the court 
finds that the state action was 
undertaken without substantial 
justification. 
1 
3. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-27a-5 (1) . Litigation expense 
award authorized in appeals from administrative decisions. 
(1) In any civil judicial appeal taken 
from an administrative decision regarding 
a matter in which the administrative 
action was commenced by the state, and 
which involves the business regulatory 
functions of the state, a court may award 
reasonable litigation expenses to any 
small business which is a named party if 
the small business prevails in the appeal 
and the court finds that the state action 
was undertaken without substantial 
justification. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l (2002). 
See Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Commission does not dispute the statement of the 
case by the Cafe as it relates to this issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1995, the Salt Lake County Assessor (the "County 
Assessor") assessed a privilege tax against the Cafe for its 
use of property located at 300 South Rio Grande Street, Salt 
Lake City, which was owned by the State of Utah and exempt 
from property tax under Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah 
Constitution (R. at 272-273) . In addition to the privilege 
tax assessed for 1995, the Assessor also imposed an escaped 
property tax assessment and penalty against the Cafe for the 
2 
years 1990-1994 (R. at 273). 
The Cafe appealed the assessments to the Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization (the "Board") (R. at 576). 
After the Board upheld the assessments (R. at 273), the Cafe 
appealed the Board's decision to the Utah State Tax 
Commission (the "Commission") (R. at 576). The Commission 
determined that the Cafe qualified for the concession 
exemption to the privilege tax, and that the assessments 
made by the County Assessor were, therefore, in error (R. at 
8-25) . 
Subsequently, the Appellant, Salt Lake County (the 
"County"), by filing a Petition for Review, appealed the 
Commission's decision to the District Court (R. at 1-5). The 
Cafe, in answering the County's petition, maintained that it 
qualified for the concession exemption and also sought an 
award of litigation expenses pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27a-l, et seq. (R. at 186-191). The District Court, in an 
order dated December 9, 2003, rejected the Cafe's claim for 
litigation expenses because the County did not act without 
substantial justification as required by the statute. (R. at 
640-642). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Cafe is not entitled to an award of litigation 
expenses under the Small Business Equal Access to Justice 
Act (the "Act") because a privilege tax assessment does not 
involve the business regulatory functions of the state. Even 
if the Court were to rule that a privilege tax assessment 
involved a business regulatory function, the Cafe would 
still not qualify for reimbursement of litigation expenses 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27a-5 because a privilege tax 
assessment does not commence an administrative action. 
Under the Act, a small business can claim an award of 
litigation expenses if it prevails in a judicial action 
commenced by the state or in an appeal of an administrative 
action commenced by the state if the judicial or 
administrative action involves the business regulatory 
functions of the state and was undertaken without 
substantial justification. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27a-4. 
The matter at issue in this case does not involve the 
business regulatory functions of the state because it 
involves a privilege tax assessment by the County used to 
raise revenue for general governmental purposes and not to 
control or regulate business. In addition, the privilege tax 
4 
assessment did not commence an administrative action since 
the action was commenced with the Cafe's challenge to the 
assessment in accordance with the Administrative Procedures 
Act of Utah. Therefore, because the Cafe does not satisfy 
the requirements of the Act, this Court should affirm the 
district court's rejection of the Cafe's claim for 
litigation expenses. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
ORDER REJECTING THE CAFE'S CLAIM FOR LITIGATION 
EXPENSES UNDER THE SMALL BUSINESS EQUAL ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE ACT BECAUSE THE CIVIL JUDICIAL APPEAL 
AROSE FROM AN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION THAT DID NOT 
INVOLVE THE BUSINESS REGULATORY FUNCTIONS OF THE 
STATE AND WAS NOT COMMENCED BY THE STATE. 
The Cafe's claim for litigation expenses under the 
Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act should be denied 
because the property tax assessment at issue in this case 
does not involve a "business regulatory function of the 
state." Furthermore, no claim can be brought under Section 
78-27a-5 because the administrative action that led to the 
judicial appeal was not commenced by the state1. 
Although the Court's decision on these issues will have 
1
 The term "state" referenced in the Act and used in 
this brief means Salt Lake County as defined by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27a-3(4). 
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no direct consequences to the Commission in this particular 
case because it is the County that has sought judicial and 
appellate review, an adverse ruling on these issues may 
impact the Commission in other cases. 
Moreover, because the County, not the Commission, is 
the target of the litigation expenses sought by the Cafe in 
its cross-appeal, the Commission will not address the issue 
of substantial justification and leaves that issue to be 
briefed by the other parties. Notwithstanding, the issue of 
"substantial justification" is moot if the Court finds that 
the tax assessed was not a regulatory function of the state. 
A. Taxation is not a business regulatory function 
of the state. 
A tax assessed by the state does not involve a 
"business regulatory function" as the plain language of both 
sections 78-27a-4 and -5 require. When construing a statute, 
it is presumed "that the legislature used each term 
advisedly. . ." and effect is given "to each term according 
to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Versluis v. Guaranty 
Nat. Companies, 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "regulation" as "[t]he 
act or process of controlling by rule or restriction." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1289 (7th ed. 1999). On the other 
6 
hand, "taxation" is defined as "the imposition or assessment 
of a tax; the means by which the state obtains the revenue 
required for its activities." Id. at 1473. From the 
ordinary and accepted meanings of these words, it is clear 
that the assessment of a privilege tax2 used to raise 
revenue and not to control a business does not involve a 
business regulatory function of the state. As a result, the 
Cafe has not met the threshold requirement to successfully 
claim attorney's fees under the Small Business Equal Access 
to Justice Act. 
Further, while no Utah cases have directly addressed 
the issue of what constitutes a business regulatory function 
2
 The privilege tax is a counterpart to the property tax 
and is used to equalize the tax burden between owners of 
private property and users of tax-exempt property. See, 
e.g., County Bd. of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) ("This construction would 
place a land user or possessor in a more advantageous 
position than an owner and would contravene the stated 
purpose of the privilege tax, which is to "close any gaps in 
the tax laws.") (quoting Great Salt Lake Minerals & 
Chemicals Corp., v. State Tax Comm'n, 573 P.2d 337, 339 
(Utah 1977). The tax is "imposed on the possession or other 
beneficial use enjoyed by any person of any real or personal 
property which for any reason is exempt from taxation." Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (1) (a) (2000). The amount of the 
privilege tax "is the same amount that the ad valorem 
property tax would be if the possessor or user were the 
owner of the property." Id. § 59-4-101(2). 
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as required under the Act, various Utah courts, in 
distinguishing between taxes and fees, have found that taxes 
are usually used to raise revenue while fees are sometimes 
used to regulate businesses. Eg., Consolidation Coal Co. v. 
Emery County, 702 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1985); V-l Oil Co. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 911 (Utah 
1996)(reversed on motion for rehearing on factual grounds). 
"Generally speaking, a tax raises revenue for general 
governmental purposes, while a fee raises revenue either to 
compensate the government for the provision of a specific 
service or benefit to the one paying the fee or to defray 
the government's costs of regulating and policing a business 
or activity engaged in by the one paying the fee." V-l Oil, 
942 P.2d at 911. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court, in Davis 
v. Qgden City, 215 P.2d 616, 620 (Utah 1950), found that the 
power to tax for revenue-raising purposes and the power to 
regulate are two separate powers. Because there is no 
evidence that the privilege tax assessed in this case 
against the Cafe is a fee to regulate the Cafe's business, 
the assessment of the privilege tax cannot be considered a 
business regulatory function of the state for purposes of 
the Act. 
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The Cafe argues that the Court's failure to address the 
regulatory function requirement in V-l Oil, which was 
initially deemed to be a taxation case, implies that the 
Court considered the requirement automatically met. 
However, the Court, in V-l Oil, simply did not need to reach 
the issue of what constitutes a business regulatory function 
because it had already rejected V-l Oil's request for 
litigation expenses on other grounds—namely, the State did 
not commence the action or act without substantial 
justification. Furthermore, the Court subsequently reversed 
its holding, on rehearing, finding that the surcharge in 
question in that case was really a fee and not a tax. No 
such finding has occurred here. Therefore, V-l Oil provides 
no support for the position that the assessment of a 
privilege tax is a business regulatory function of the 
state. 
There is no evidence here to dispute that the 
assessment imposed against the Cafe is a tax. As such, the 
privilege tax assessed in this case does not involve a 
business regulatory function of the State and the Cafe's 
request for litigation expenses under the Small Business 
Equal Access to Justice Act should be denied. 
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B. The Cafe is also not entitled to an award of 
litigation expenses under section 78-27a-5 because 
the county's tax assessment did not commence the 
administrative action. 
To successfully bring a claim for litigation expenses 
under Section 78-27a-5, the administrative action being 
reviewed must have been "commenced by the state." This 
requirement is in addition to the requirement that the 
matter involve a business regulatory function of the state. 
The Cafe commenced the administrative action in this case 
when it appealed the county assessor's tax assessment to the 
Board under section 59-2-1004 (2000), and again when it 
appealed the Board's decision to the Utah State Tax 
Commission pursuant to section 59-2-1006 (2000). Because it 
was the Cafe, and not the County, that commenced the 
administrative action, the Cafe cannot claim litigation 
expenses under section 78-27a-5. 
Contrary to the Cafe's assertion, an administrative 
action is not commenced when an agency issues a tax 
assessment against a taxpayer. Administrative actions are 
commenced through procedures found in the Administrative 
Procedures Act ("APA"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3 (1997). 
The APA specifically does not apply to the "issuance of any 
tax assessment." § 63-46b-l. Further, in setting forth its 
10 
applicability, the APA states that it governs "any agency 
action commenced by the taxpayer. . .to contest the validity 
or correctness of," inter alia, "the issuance of any tax 
assessment." § 63-46b-l(2) (b) (emphasis added). Thus, an 
agency action is not commenced by the issuance of a tax 
assessment, but by a taxpayer's challenge to the assessment. 
Since it was the Cafe that commenced the agency action when 
it appealed the County Assessor's tax assessment to the 
Board of Equalization and subsequently to the Utah State Tax 
Commission, the Cafe cannot claim litigation expenses under 
section 78-27a-5. Therefore, the Cafe's claim should also be 
denied under section 78-27a-5 because the County's tax 
assessment did not commence the administrative action. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the district court's order 
rejecting the Cafe's claim for litigation expenses because 
the privilege tax assessment at issue is not a business 
regulatory function. Alternatively, the privilege tax 
assessment did not commence an administrative action as 
required by section 78-27-5. 
11 
DATED this / day of July, 2004 
TIMOTHY A. BODi: 
Assistant Attorney General 
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78-27a-l. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Small Business 
Equal Access to Justice Act." 
78-27a-2. Legislative findings - Purpose. 
The Legislature finds that small businesses may be deterred from 
seeking review of or defending against substantially unjustified 
governmental action because of the expense involved in securing 
the vindication of their rights. The purpose of this act is to 
entitle small businesses, under conditions set forth in this act, 
to recover reasonable litigation expenses. 
78-27a-3. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final judgment, the right 
to all appeals having been exhausted, on the merits, on 
substantially all counts or charges in the action and with 
respect to the most significant issue or set of issues presented, 
but does not include the settlement of any action, either by 
stipulation, consent decree or otherwise, whether or not 
settlement occurs before or after any hearing or trial. 
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses" means court costs, 
administrative hearing costs, attorney's fees, and witness fees 
of all necessary witnesses, not in excess of $10,000, which a 
court finds were reasonably incurred in opposing action covered 
under this act. 
(3) "Small business" means a commercial or business entity, 
including a sole proprietorship, which does not have more than 
250 employees, but does not include an entity which is a 
subsidiary or affiliate of another entity which is not a small 
business. 
(4) "State" means any department, board, institution, hospital, 
college, or university of the state of Utah or any political 
subdivision thereof, except with respect to antitrust actions 
brought under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 9. 
78-27a-4. Litigation expense award authorized in actions by 
state. 
In any civil judicial action commenced by the state, which action 
involves the business regulatory functions of the state, a court 
may award reasonable litigation expenses to any small business 
which is a named party in the action if the small business 
prevails and the court finds that the state action was undertaken 
without substantial justification. 
78-27a-5. Litigation expense award authorized in appeals from 
administrative decisions. 
1. In any civil judicial appeal taken from an administrative 
decision regarding a matter in which the administrative 
action was commenced by the state, and which involves the 
business regulatory functions of the state, a court may 
award reasonable litigation expenses to any small business 
which is a named party if the small business prevails in the 
appeal and the court finds that the state action was 
undertaken without substantial justification. 
2. Any state agency or political subdivision may require by 
rule or ordinance that a small business exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to making a claim under this 
act. 
78-27a-6. Payment of expenses awarded - Statement required in 
agency's budget. 
Expenses awarded under this act shall be paid from funds in the 
regular operating budget of the state entity. If sufficient funds 
are not available in the budget of the entity, the expenses shall 
be considered a claim governed by the provisions of Title 63, 
Chapter 6. Every state entity against which litigation expenses 
have been awarded under this act shall, at the time of submission 
of its proposed budget, submit a report to the governmental body 
which appropriates its funds in which the amount of expenses 
awarded and paid under this act during the fiscal year is stated. 
ADDENDUM B 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter. 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as 
otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of this 
chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the provisions of 
this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal 
rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests 
of one or more identifiable persons, including all agency actions 
to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or 
amend an authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of these actions. 
(2) This chapter does not govern: 
(a) the procedures for making agency rules, or the judicial 
review of those procedures or rules; 
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the 
payment of a tax, the decision to waive penalties or interest on 
taxes, the imposition of and penalties or interest on taxes, or 
the issuance of any tax assessment, except that this chapter 
governs any agency action commenced by a taxpayer or by another 
person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness 
of those actions; 
